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A ‘Tainted Brand’? 
Britain’s Prevent 
Programme
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Starting Questions from Britain’s experience
• What are these ‘soft’ counter-terrorism policies actually 
about – what is their purpose?
• To what extent can they actually prevent any acts of 
terrorism – what is the predictive power of models of 
‘radicalisation’?
• Is the ‘resilience’ they seek to create just about 
vulnerable individuals or is it resilience within and 
between communities?
• Are these policies proportionate and justifiable – do they 
uphold democratic values?
Ground-level research on extremism 
prevention in practice
• ‘Open Talk, Open Minds’ – anti-racist work with white young people
• Community Cohesion/integration in youth work and community work  
practice
• Implementing Prevent
• Prevent, extremism and youth identifications
• White community attitudes to integration and to far-right protest 
groups
• The ‘Think Project’ anti-extremism education
Implementation of British multiculturalist policies has often 
looked very different at ground level – the importance of 
local experience
Local evidence – British multiculturalism 
is NOT dead!
The evidence on Prevent
• It has changed and adapted significantly since its origins in 2007, 
both within and between its two distinct phases (‘Prevent 1’: 2007-
2011; ‘Prevent 2’: 2011 onwards)
• There have been significant tensions over it within the national state 
and between the national state and local authorities
• The charge that it is simply a ‘spying programme’ is (was?) too 
simplistic because of Muslim agency/involvement in it… BUT
• Prevent has very significant flaws which I argue have not been 
addressed and are actively becoming more problematic
• This leads to genuine debate about whether this Prevent 
programme is actually counter-productive
Prevent 1: 2007-2011
• Funding for all local authorities with a certain number of 
Muslim residents – Prevent 1 was explicitly only about 
Muslims
• A strong focus within this on youth and on building the 
capacity of local Muslim civic society and representation
• National programmes of different/’moderate’ Muslim 
voices/leadership (youth/women) and religious practice
• Over 300 dedicated Police posts purely for 
‘engagement’(this element continues)
Prevent 2: 2011 onwards
• Local authority programme is very significantly scaled down and is 
entirely controlled by London counter-terrorism centre (OSCT) –
local government department (DCLG) completely removed from 
Prevent and now little/no funding for Muslim organisations
• Police programme continues so now Prevent resources are 
overwhelmingly Police salaries
• Much more emphasis on the ‘Channel’ programme of counter-
radicalisation counselling for individuals identified as ‘at risk’, not just 
of ‘violent extremism’ but ‘extremism’ generally
• Large-scale training of public servants on how to ‘spot’ and refer 
individuals ‘at risk’ and legal duty imposed on all public bodies to 
enact this approach
Prevent’s flaws and problems
• A counter-productive focus on Muslims as an entire 
community
• A blatant contradiction to policies of Community 
Cohesion/Integration
• The centrality of the problematic concept of 
‘radicalisation’
• The securitisation of education and community relations
• The lack of educational approaches that build genuine 
community resilience and which uphold our democratic 
values
A counter-productive focus on Muslims 
as an entire community
• Large-scale funding for Muslim groups in Prevent 1 
created ‘resource envy’ from other communities
• Its scale hardened resentment and fears within Muslim 
communities over this state scrutiny – disproportionate to 
the threat and ignoring far-right racism
• Very significant community development work within 
Muslim communities but from counter-terrorism funding
• Funding caused splits within communities and often went 
to traditional/conservative ‘leaders’ in practice
A blatant contradiction to policies of 
Community Cohesion/Integration
• Community Cohesion policy shift from 2001 identified that focus on and 
support from distinct and separate ethnic ‘communities’ was now counter-
productive.
• Cohesion sees extremism as more able to grow in segregated communities
• Instead, a shift to focus on commonality and contact work between 
communities – this is/was very strongly supported by local policy-makers 
and practitioners
• Prevent was a total contradiction to this
• In Prevent 1 there was parallel cohesion funding but Prevent squeezed 
cohesion work out; in Prevent 2 all national funding and concern for 
cohesion has disappeared and we now have ‘policed multiculturalism’ 
(Raggazi, 2014)
The centrality of the problematic concept of 
‘radicalisation’
• Problem – we know some individuals are attracted towards violence 
but the model of ‘radicalisation’ is highly problematic; its predictive 
powers are VERY weak
• ‘Radicalisation’ seems to work on a simplistic binary of 
radical/moderate but youth ‘radicalism’ is often fluid, contingent and 
‘performative’
• Prevent 1 had some focus on ‘hearts and minds’ and engagement 
with broader Muslim communities and institutions whilst trying to use 
the radicalisation model; Prevent 2 is increasingly all about 
operationalising the radicalisation model
• The results are predictable – clumsy and inappropriate surveillance
The securitisation of education and 
community relations
• The Police/Counter Terrorism Unit cultural power mean that Prevent quickly 
came to dominate community cohesion nationally and locally
• The Police/CTU also quickly became dominant in local Prevent 
arrangements
• The Police/CTU role in local Prevent 1 implementation provoked spying 
allegations and the House of Commons Inquiry that led to the 2011 review 
and Prevent 2
• The Prevent 2 prioritisation of ‘spotting’ radicalisation has led to very 
significant Police involvement in schools, colleges and other public spaces, 
including direct educational delivery – recent controversies over schools are 
the inevitable result: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jun/10/schools-trial-anti-radicalisation-software-pupils-internet
The lack of educational approaches
• Prevent 1 ‘engaged’ with lots of Muslim young people but there was little/no 
evidence of genuine educational processes that confront and build 
resilience against extremism
• This was because there has been no effort to offer training for educators on 
how to encourage and facilitate open and robust dialogue that enables 
students to discuss political issues – without this and without clear political 
encouragement, educators understandably avoid such issues
• Prevent 2 prioritises ‘spotting’ radicalisation but this has a tension with open 
dialogue approaches
• Citizenship teaching has been downgraded in schools and Prevent funding 
goes to the Police, NOT anti-extremism education projects
Prevent – productive ways forward?
• The Police/CTU need to step back significantly if this 
programme is to have any positive impact
• There needs to be much more focus on education:
- With broader groups of young people to build youth 
resilience in a non-stigmatising manner and in ways that 
uphold values of equal, democratic citizenship
- With targeted groups of young people through specialist 
anti-extremism educational projects
• We need to trust in education more!
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